Based on a large panel of Italian SMEs, this paper focuses on the relationship between firms" default probability and the amount of bank debt they obtain, evaluating whether and to what extent this link is affected by the degree of competition characterizing the local credit market where firms operate. Using a dynamic panel estimator, we find that higher bank competition implies a stronger influence of firms" riskiness on bank financing to SMEs. We provide two plausible interpretations of this finding: one resorting to more accurate screening by more competitive banks; the other alleging lower market power of incumbent banks, which may restrict their willingness to finance riskier firms.
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade an intense dispute in the economic literature has been centered on the question "is competition among banks good or bad?". As Cetorelli (2001) claims, the need for such a debate would be unjustified if banks" role were simply to intermediate between supply and demand of credit. In that case, in fact, there would not be reasons to treat banks differently from other firms or to doubt that market power in credit markets is likely to lead to welfare losses, as asserted by the common wisdom. However banks perform other crucial functions in an economy, such as the screening of investment projects and, through this, the allocation of capital resources to the best social uses. Understanding how credit market structure may affect these additional banks" functions represents the meaning and focus of the banking competition debate.
So far, studies on this topic have reached controversial results -on both theoretical and empirical grounds -thus calling for further research. This paper aspires to contribute to the empirical literature on banking competition by indirectly investigating the impact of credit market structure on banks" screening activity. More precisely, we focus on the relationship between default probability and bank debt at firm level and question if and to what extent this link is influenced by the degree of banking competition characterizing the local credit market in which firms operate. Our hypothesis may be stated as follows: if competition in credit markets affects banks" probability to screenas shown, both theoretically and empirically, by several contributions in the literature on bank market structure, briefly reviewed in the next section -then it is reasonable to suppose that firms" riskiness (which is the core of bank screening) should have, ceteris paribus, a different effect both on the cost and quantity of credit to entrepreneurships, depending on the degree of bank competition.
Since we lack information on loans interest rates at firm level, our hypothesis is investigated considering the relationship going from firms" default probability to their bank debt. We do not posit any a priori expectation on the sign of this relationship (thus leaving it to be an empirical finding) -since the theoretical implications of firms" characteristics, such as default risk, on lending volumes are not univocal (i.e. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 versus de Meza and Webb, 1987 ; for a wide discussion on this debate see Cressy, 2002) . 3 To carry out the empirical analysis, we focus on Italian small and medium sized manufacturing firms (henceforth SMEs), which have little access to capital markets (either public equity or bond market) and are bound to ask credit from banks with branches in the same local market where they operate. Indeed, as Cesarini (2003) highlights, once internal funds are depleted, the banking channel is often the only way for Italian SMEs -usually facing high costs in employing arm's length finance (bond and Stock Exchange markets finance) -to gain access to external funds.
Consistently with other contributions on the Italian banking system, we define 103 local markets corresponding to the existing administrative provinces. This disaggregation enables us to take advantage of an important feature of the Italian case. Indeed, Italian provinces are characterized by diversity in banking structures and this provides sufficient cross-sectional variability within a single institutional framework. Given this regulatory uniformity, there is no need to control for different regimes (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell"Ariccia, 2004) .
To measure banking competition in local credit markets, we employ the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) on deposits which "represents a good proxy for competition in loan markets if the empirical investigation involves firms that largely borrow from local markets, that is if credit markets are local for the firms under consideration" (Petersen and Rajan, 1995 p. 418 ). As claimed above, this is the case for our sample units.
The indicators of firms" default probability used in this paper have been computed by Moody"s KMV on our sample data, via RiskCalc model. As argued by Moody"s KMV, this model enables high precision and accuracy in evaluating private firm credit risk by using financial statements and, for listed firms, equity market-based information. The RiskCalc model is adopted by leading Italian banks as a benchmark for their internal credit risk estimates. In the empirical investigation we employ the cumulative EDF (Expected Default Frequency) measures -which are actual firms" default probabilities -within one, three and five years.
The econometric analysis, implemented on a large set of micro-data running up to 2003 from 1995, is carried out by employing the dynamic panel estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , which allows to take into account the role of firm-specific effects (unobserved heterogeneity), as well as the "endogeneity" of a number of bank debt determinants.
Our results seem to indicate that higher competition in local credit markets implies a stronger influence of firms" riskiness on the amount of bank debt granted to small and medium entrepreneurships (as well as on their bank debt growth). So that, since the relationship between firms" riskiness and bank debt is found negative, ceteris paribus, bank financing tends to be lower for riskier SMEs running in more competitive credit markets. In our view, a plausible interpretation of this evidence is that -as argued also by other contributions (i.e. Benfratello et al, 2006 ) -competitive pressures might force banks to perform more accurate screening, thus raising their efficiency in funds allocation. However, bank financing to riskier firms could be lower in more competitive credit markets for a reason unrelated to bank screening: higher bank competition may reduce the market power of incumbent banks, hence lowering their willingness to finance riskier firms -an explanation in line with Petersen and Rajan"s (1995) findings. As we argue below (see section 5), both these interpretations may be considered likewise plausible, as well as not conflicting with each other, since the conceptual mechanisms they subtend may jointly represent the source of our evidence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the literature on the economic effects of banking competition. Section 3 illustrates the econometric specification and the methodology adopted. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 reports the results obtained and the robustness checks performed. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW
In a decade or so of debate on banking competition a considerable body of research has been proposed. Given the scope of our work, in what follows we focus briefly only on the most relevant contributions that have analyzed -both theoretically and empirically -the effects of banking com-5 petition on banks" screening activity or, more generally, the role of banking market structure on funds allocation in the economy.
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In a model of bank screening, Shaffer (1998) shows that the average creditworthiness of a bank"s pool of borrowers declines as banking competition increases. In a similar model, Cao and Shi (2001) prove that a more intense banking competition can reduce banks" screening incentives, so that the number of banks actively performing screening and competing in credit supply falls. As a result, in a market with many banks, loan rates would be higher and credit volumes lower than in a market with a few banks. In line with this study, Dell'Ariccia (2000) concludes that more banking competition reduces the likelihood that banks will screen entrepreneurs, as opposed to indiscriminate lending.
Using a dynamic model of capital accumulation, Cetorelli (1997) points out that a monopolistic credit market brings about a trade-off between efficient allocation of funds and quantity of credit made available. A monopolist bank can efficiently screen potential borrowers, thus increasing the quality of credit supply. On the other hand, the rent-extraction behavior of the monopolist bank produces a negative effect on equilibrium credit quantities. Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) identify the same trade-off in a Cournot oligopoly model. Chiesa (1998) claims that when banks engage in information production about firms, a concentrated banking industry leads credit allocation to be closer to the first-best optimum. Similarly, Gehrig (1998) shows that -when banks use screening procedures that generate (imperfect) information on borrowers -an increased competition reduces screening efforts, so that the quality of the overall loan portfolio declines. Also Marquez (2002) , Gehrig and Stenbacka (2001) , and Hauswald and Marquez (2006) argue that competition reduces banks" screening ability by worsening the pool 1 As a consequence, we do not discuss the many studies analyzing the role of banking competition on credit availability to firms or on some other economic aspect, such as capital accumulation, growth etc. For an extensive review of these contributions see Cetorelli (2001) . For more general reviews on the issue of banking competition see Berger et al. (1999) , Carletti et al. (2002) , Northcott (2004) , Degryse and Ongena (2008) . of loan applicants. Manove et al. (2001) show that, in a competitive environment, the use of collateral in debt contracts may lead banks" screening effort below its socially efficient level.
De Mello (2004) analyzes a model in which the impact of bank market power on credit supply depends on how much information about borrowers is available. He provides evidence that, by increasing the rent extraction associated with acquiring private information on firms, market power induces more investment in private information acquisition, so as to recruit good borrowers. Boot and Thakor (2000) develop a banking model to study the nature of lending relationships and how these depend on competition, finding that increased bank competition improves welfare for intermediate and high quality borrowers, whereas low-quality borrowers may be either better or worse off.
Beside these studies, other works reach different conclusions. Strahan (1996, 1998) 2 On the beneficial dynamic effects of banking competition following deregulation in the U.S. see also Strahan (2003) .
For the Italian case, see Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) .
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The studies so far surveyed indicate unsettlement in the literature as to the effects of credit market structure on banks" screening activity and, through this way, on their role in allocating capital resources in the economy. This calls for further research, and the present paper aims to bring a new contribution on the topic. The empirical question we consider, along with the methodology employed, are described in the next section.
EMPIRICAL QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY
By employing Italian SMEs data we analyze the relationship between default probability and bank debt at firm level -evaluating whether and to what extent this link is affected by the degree of banking competition in the local credit market in which firms operate. The intuition behind this analysis is that if competition in credit markets affects banks" probability to screen, as shown by the literature on bank market structure, then (ceteris paribus) the effect of firms" default probability on the amount of credit granted to entrepreneurships should be different, depending on the degree of bank competition. 3 To carry out this test, we follow the empirical strategy described in the next two sub-sections.
The econometric specification
The estimating equation presents the following specification:
where indices i and t refer to individuals and time periods, respectively, and the dependent variable (BANKDEBT) is the ratio of bank debt to total assets. On the right hand side, RISK(1/3/5) is the 3 As indicated in section 1, we lack information on loans interest rates at firm level, and it is for this reason that we focus only on the relationship going from SMEs" riskiness to their bank debt. Moreover, we do not have any a priori expectation on the sign of this relationship -being the theoretical implications of firms" characteristics on lending volumes not univocal (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; de Meza and Webb, 1987; Cressy, 2002). one, three or five years firm"s default probability, calculated by Moody"s KMV on our sample data via RiskCalc model (see Section 4 for more details); HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on deposits; 4 RISK*HHI (hereafter INTE) is the interaction term between the two variables aforementioned. 5 The vector X includes the following set of firm-specific control variables: (the log of) firm age (AGE) and its square (AGE 2 ); (the log of) total assets (TA) and its square (TA 2 ); a measure of physical capital intensity, proxied by the ratio of tangible assets to total assets (TGASS); CASH-FLOW; the ratio of liquid to total assets (LIQUI); the ratio of trade debt to total assets (TRD), as trade debt may be a substitute for bank debt (on this point see, for instance, De Blasio 2005); a group membership dummy (GROU), equal to 1 for firms belonging to a group and 0 otherwise;
Pavitt dummies (PAV), to take into account heterogeneity at sectoral level. The vector X includes also two variables at provincial level: the (log of) total deposits (DEP), to control for the size of the banking market, and the ratio of bad loans to total loans (BAD) as a proxy for credit market riski- 
The HHI stems from the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, which states that firms" profits are likely to be higher in more concentrated markets, where firms have greater market power and the collusion among them might be easier. This prediction has been criticized by various authors (e.g. Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977) , and -with respect to the banking sector -some studies have found weak evidence in favor of a positive relationship between market concentration and profitability (e.g. Rhoades, 1995; Hannan, 1997) . On the other hand, there are several contributions providing empirical support to the main argument of the SCP paradigm (e.g. Berger and Hannan, 1989; Hannan and Berger, 1991; Pilloff and Rhoades, 2002) . See Gilbert (1984) , Weiss (1989) , and Gilbert and Zaretsky (2003) 
where ˆ*HHI is the estimated coefficient of the interaction term multiplied by the local banking competition indicator, while  is the estimated coefficient of RISK, indicating the marginal effect of RISK on BANKDEBT when HHI is zero. Finally, the significance of (2) is tested by calculating the relative standard error:
Since both (2) and (3) depend on the level of HHI, the marginal effect of RISK may change sign and gain or lose significance according to the value of the competition variable. To summarize this rich piece of information, the marginal effect of RISK will be graphed, along with its 95% confidence intervals, across the range of HHI. 
The estimation method
As introduced above, the dependent variable is the ratio of bank loans to total assets. This variable is zero for a non-negligible proportion of the population, and is essentially continuous over positive values. In other words, there is a mass point at zero because many individuals find a corner solution optimal. In these cases, the most commonly used method is the Tobit model. The latter, however, posits a number of limitations as the same vectors of variables and coefficients determine both the probability that an observation is censored and the level of the dependent variable. In many circumstances where there are fixed costs of moving away from the mass point, this is not the case.
Indeed, recent contributions on financing patterns around the world and financial relations between banks and firms assume a two-step process with regard to how firms decide their external financing sources (see, for instance, Beck et al, 2002; Hori and Osano, 2003) . First, the managers choose a particular source of financing. Next, they decide the proportion of investment to finance through that source. In line with this two-step assumption, it is advocated the use of sample selection (or double hurdle) models, where the determinants of selection and amount may differ, or a given set of determinants may have different levels of relative importance.
In the present study, we test for the presence of non-random selection bias by adopting the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (1995, p. 124) , which "can be viewed as an extension of Heckman"s (1979) procedure to an unobserved effects framework". 8 As this test is not significant at the conventional levels, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of absence of correlation between the se-lection and the amount processes. Hence, the latter can be estimated separately. When equation (1) is estimated by adopting a FE panel model the RISK coefficient is always positive (and statistically significant when using RISK3 and RISK5). Such a result, yet, is based on the assumption that all regressors are exogenous. However, the RISK variable (along with other explanatory variables) is likely to be endogenous. Indeed, a reverse causality may be at work: on one hand, borrowers" risk of failure is expected to influence banks" lending decisions; on the other hand, borrowers" risk can be influenced by available credit. 9 Moreover, some explanatory variables may be regarded as predetermined. 10 Furthermore, thus far we have assumed that there is no dynamic adjustment for the dependent variable. A general approach to relax these assumptions, and still control for unobserved heterogeneity, consists of two steps. Firstly, the data are transformed in order to eliminate the unobserved individual effects, and then valid instrumental variables are employed, so as to deal with the endogeneity problem posed by some regressors and the dynamic adjustment term. In the present paper, we adopt the so-called system GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . These authors propose a GMM procedure exploiting both the entire set of internal instruments for the model in first differences, under the assumption of white noise errors (as the GMM-difference estimator of Arellano and Bond, 1991) , and extra orthogonality conditions for the model in levels. Such extra conditions "remain informative even for persistent se- 9 The suspicion that RISK may be endogenous is also related to the fact that, as illustrated by Moody"s KMV (2006, p. 12), a leverage variable is included in the EDF estimation. This variable is defined as (Net Worth minus Intangible Assets) to (Assets minus Intangible Assets), implying that: "large leverage corresponds to low levels of Tangible Net Worth to Tangible Assets and high default risk" (ibid: p. 12).
10 The latter type of variables are potentially correlated with past values of the idiosyncratic error, but are not correlated to its present and future values. A strictly exogenous variable is uncorrelated with past, present and future values of the error term. In equation (1), if it appears plausible that the current value of a regressor (such as tangible assets) is influenced by past shocks to profitability, that variable is treated as predetermined. When a variable (such as RISK) is likely to be determined simultaneously along with the amount of debt, it is treated as endogenous. As a result, we treat as exogenous only Pavitt dummies and the DEP variable.
ries, and (the system estimator) has been shown to perform well in simulations" (Bond et al, 2001, p. 4) , increasing the efficiency of the estimation. formation on branches with ABI data on deposits at single bank level we have been able to implement the criterion described in sub-section 3.1 (footnote 4) to compute the HHI for each Italian 11 More precisely, the system GMM estimator, along with the moment conditions of the GMM difference, uses the lagged differences of the regressors as instruments for the equation in levels. The main assumption underlying the use of moment restrictions in levels is that the unobserved effects are not correlated with changes in the error term.
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province. It is worth noticing that aggregate deposits at provincial level (DEP) and BAD are also drawn from the Bank of Italy dataset.
Finally, as previously mentioned, data on firm riskiness come from Moody"s KMV. By using the RiskCalc model -a rating model elaborated to forecast firms" insolvency -Moody"s KMV computed the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) for the firms included in our sample. The EDF are actual firms" default probabilities and, for SMEs, are estimated relying on balance sheet and sectoral information. In the econometric analysis we employ the cumulative EDF within one, three, and five years. 12 After matching the information gathered from all the abovementioned sources, and accounting for the presence of potential outliers, 13 we obtain the estimation sample presented in Table 2. Table 3 reports the SYS-GMM estimates. Column (2) shows the results obtained when the measure of prospective insolvency (RISK) indicates the default probability within one year, while the other two adjacent columns show those obtained when the insolvency measure expresses the probability that a firm goes bankrupt within three and five years, respectively. The standard errors (not reported) are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels, and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.
RESULTS
Looking first at the diagnostic statistics, the autocorrelation tests signal in all regressions a strong first order correlation in the differenced residuals but no higher order autocorrelation, therefore supporting the assumption of lack of autocorrelation in the errors in levels underlying the estimator.
Moreover, the Hansen test cannot reject the null hypothesis of validity of the over-identifying re-12 For further details on the RiskCalc model we refer the reader to the Moody"s KMV website. 13 For each variable involved in the econometric analysis, the observations lying in the first and last half percentile of the distribution have been dropped.
strictions, and the difference in Hansen test supports the validity of the additional instruments used by the SYS-GMM estimator.
14 Focusing on the variables of interest, the RISK coefficient is always negative and statistically significant -while the INTE coefficient is all the time positive, but individually significant (at 10% level) only when the dependent variable is RISK1. Nonetheless, as shown by the F-tests reported, the interaction term is always jointly significant with the RISK regressor. 15 Therefore, the estimates in Table 3 seem to indicate that the likelihood of going bankrupt exerts a reductive effect on the amount of bank debt when the HHI is zero (and, hence, the interaction term is zero). However, since HHI is never zero in our sample, this provides us with limited information. More accurately, to analyze the marginal impact of the default probability for different levels of banking market concentration, we compute the marginal effect of RISK conditional on the value of HHI, and depict it across the entire range of the HHI by means of Figure 1 . 16 Looking at this latter, the RISK variable appears to have a negative and significant impact for a large part of the HHI values: the percentage of observations falling within the region of significance is close to 60%. 17 Moreover, Figure 1 indicates that -in the statistically significant region -the estimated marginal effect of RISK on BANK-14 The estimates are obtained by using a subset of the available instruments. This is because, as Altonji and Segal (1994) point out, the use of all instruments implies small-sample downward bias of the coefficients and standard errors. 15 The divergence between individual and joint significance may be interpreted as a symptom of multicollinearity (see there really is high multicollinearity and this leads to large standard errors on the model parameters, it is important to remember that these standard errors are never in any sense "too" large -they are always the "correct" standard errors.
High multicollinearity simply means that there is not enough information in the data to estimate the model parameters accurately and the standard errors rightfully reflect this"".
16 See sub-section 3.1 for the marginal effect and standard error formulas.
17 As far as the not statistically significant region is concerned, the marginal effect of RISK on BANKDEBT is positive for values of HHI greater than (about) 16.5. The observations falling beyond this threshold, however, are only 7%.
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DEBT decreases (in absolute value) when moving from lower to higher values of banking concentration. By and large, our econometric results seem to indicate that a lower (higher) local credit market concentration implies a stronger (weaker) influence of firms" riskiness on the amount of bank debt granted to SMEs. Since the relationship between firms" riskiness and bank debt is negative, ceteris paribus, bank financing appears to be lower (higher) for riskier SMEs running in more (less) competitive credit markets. In our view, these findings may represent evidence that a stronger bank competition could spur financial institutions to perform more accurate firms" screening. However, it is also reasonable to argue that bank financing to riskier firms could be lower in more competitive credit markets for a reason not related to bank screening: higher bank competition may erode the market power of incumbent banks, thus lowering their willingness to finance riskier firms.
18 To economize on space, and also as they lead to the same conclusions, the graphs obtained when using the other two risk measures (RISK3 and RISK5) are omitted, but are available from the authors on request. It is worth mentioning that the only noticeable difference among the three graphs is the absolute value of the marginal effect of RISK. Indeed, the negative impact that the RISK variable exerts on BANKDEBT keeps decreasing (in absolute terms) when passing from the first measure to the last one. In other words, bank loans appear to be more affected by the probability of default within the current year, than by those within three and five years.
As claimed by an anonymous referee, the possibility that our evidence is compatible with interpretations different from the one we offer is to some extent related to the structure of the dataset employed. Indeed, while the latter provides information on the annual stock of firm"s bank debt, it does not allow us to distinguish whether (and to what extent) this debt is granted by "new banks"
(meaning those which had not given credit to a firm before) or by banks having long-term relationships with firms. In deciding whether to extend or deny new credit to their borrowers, the former "new banks" have the need to screen new borrowers, while the latter financial institutions probably rely on the outcomes of monitoring activity (rather than on a new screening process). Although the validity of this argument is fully acknowledged, we believe that there is at least one peculiarity of Italian bank-firm relationships for which the explanation of our results in terms of bank screening may be considered as plausible as the other interpretation relying on the market power of incumbent banks. We are referring to the broadly documented phenomenon of multiple banking relationships, which -even though existent in some other European countries -in Italy represents a very common feature also among medium and small entrepreneurships (see, for instance : Foglia et al, 1998; D"Auria et al, 1999; Detragiache et al, 2000; Ongena and Smith, 2000; Carmignani and Omiccioli, 2007) . A likely consequence of such a widespread phenomenon might be that also firms with consolidated bank relationships could apply for credit to "new banks" (these latter understood in the sense above indicated). If so, one cannot exclude a priori that many firms in our sample were addressing new banks in the period taken into account -with the possible implication that screening represented the main bank activity for the entrepreneurships we analyzed.
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To summarize, the two interpretations so far discussed do not appear conflicting with each other;
rather, it could be the case that the insights beyond both these explanations may jointly represent the source of the empirical regularity we find.
Robustness checks
To check the robustness of the results above discussed, we have carried out several sensitivity proofs. First, equation (1) has been re-estimated by incorporating additional potential explanatory variables. To take into account effects at the macro-region level, we introduce a geographical dummy (SOUTH), which is equal to 1 if firms are located in the Southern regions of Italy and 0
otherwise. In addition, we account for some institutional and local market conditions, by adding a measure of efficiency of the judicial system (LEGENF), and a measure of the underground economy (UNDERG). 20 As shown by the results reported in columns 5-6 of Table 3 , these robustness tests leave unaltered the main conclusions reached by our analysis. 21 For the sake of conciseness, we only report the following figure obtained from the results in column 6. 21 Our main findings are substantially confirmed also when we re-estimate equation (1) replacing DHHI with BHHI -this latter being the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed on bank branches at provincial level. We do not emphasize these results, however, as the Hansen is statistically significant.
22 Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 display the estimation results when the dependent variable of equation (1) Following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we have also investigated the potential nonmonotonicity of the link between RISK and BANKDEBT, by re-estimating equation (1) with the square of RISK (1/3/5). The results of these further regressions, not reported and available upon request, seem to exclude the nonmonotonicity of ∂BANKDEBT/∂RISK. Indeed, the estimated coefficients of RISK and RISK 2 are always negative, and the latter is never individually significant.
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As further sensitive checks, the dependent variable of equation (1) is replaced with some measures of firm"s debt growth. Since we employ a dynamic model specification, to carry out such proofs we first use LNBANKDEBT -which is the natural logarithmic of (one plus) the ratio of bank debt to total assets (BANKDEBT) -and then replace LNBANKDEBT with LNBANDEBT_L, the latter being the natural log of (one plus) firm's total bank debt in levels. 24 The results from these additional estimations, reported in Table 4 (columns 2-4 and 5-7, respectively) -and exemplified by Figures 3 and 4 -clearly provide a further confirmation of our main findings. These therefore hold when we think in terms of firms" debt growth too. 25 Evidence in favor of the foremost conclu-23 It is worth mentioning that the inclusion of RISK 2 in equation (1) requires a different formulation of (2) and (3). For further details, see the webpage related to the paper of Brambor et al. (2006) , at: www.stanford.edu/~tbrambor/.
24 Broadly speaking, when the dependent variable is taken in logarithmic form and a first lag of the same variable is included in the set of regressors (as in our case), the estimated coefficients of the latter can be interpreted as marginal effects on the rate of growth of the dependent variable (see, for instance, Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006) . sions of our analysis is also found when, using LNBANKDEBT or LNBANKDEBT_L as dependent variables in equation (1) Marginal effect of RISK on lnBANKDEBT_L as HHI changes
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has been concerned with the role of credit market structure on banks" screening activity, a topic disputed in the literature. We have dealt with this issue by empirically investigating
whether and to what extent the link between a firm"s default probability and the amount of bank debt it receives is affected by the degree of competition characterizing the local credit market where the firm operates. Our approach moves from the consideration that if competition in credit markets affects banks" probability to screen, as shown by the literature on bank market structure, then (ceteris paribus) the effect of firms" default probability on credit quantity to entrepreneurships should be different, depending on the degree of bank competition. access to capital markets and are bound to ask credit from banks with branches in the same local market where they operate. The methodology adopted to implement the analysis consisted in specifying a multiplicative interaction model, in which the impact of firms" riskiness profile on their usage of bank financing is made conditional on the level of local banking concentration. Moreover, both the role of firm-specific effects and the endogeneity of several determinants of bank debt have been taken into account.
Our results suggest that in local credit markets where competition is more vigorous the influence of firms" riskiness on the amount of bank debt to small and medium entrepreneurships, as well as on firms" bank debt growth, is stronger. Since the relationship between firms" riskiness and bank debt is found negative, and ceteris paribus, bank financing appears to be lower for riskier SMEs running in more competitive credit markets. This evidence seems to be compatible with at least two explanations. On one hand, according to some contributions (i.e. Benfratello et al, 2006) , competitive pressures might stimulate banks to perform more accurate borrowers" screening, so that credit market competition would be beneficial in raising banks" efficiency in funds allocation. On the other hand, regardless of screening activity (and in line with Petersen and Rajan"s, 1995 thesis) , bank financing to riskier firms could be lower where credit competition is stronger because this latter might erode the market power of incumbent banks, thus reducing their incentives to finance higher riskier entrepreneurships.
We have argued that both the above interpretations may be considered likewise plausible, and not necessarily conflicting with each other, as the conceptual mechanisms they subtend may jointly represent the source of our evidence. Nonetheless, to shed more light on the issue addressed in this paper, ongoing research is devoted to explore novel empirical strategies aimed at directly relating local credit market competition with both banks" incentives and ability to screen. From this research we also expect to draw some indications that may further corroborate the policy implication suggested by the results of the present paper, namely that the profound transformation process of the 21
Italian banking industry -which started in the early 1990s and fostered competition in the sector (Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003) -might have improved funds allocation in the economy. For the description of the variables see Table 1 . In Italics are reported the p-values of the tests. Both the dependent variables (BANKDEBT in columns 2-4 and BANKDEBT_L in columns 5-7) are taken in natural logarithms. LNBANK-DEBT is the log of (one plus) the ratio of bank debt to total assets, while LNBANKDEBT_L is the log of (one plus) firm's total bank debt in levels. Since a lagged dependent variable is always included in the set of regressors, we can interpret the estimated coefficients of the latter as marginal effects on the rate of growth of the dependent variable,that is in terms of firms' debt growth. INTE is the interaction term between HHI and RISK 1/3/5. The variables AGE, TA and DEP are in natural logarithms. Constant and time dummies included but not reported. AB test (AR1)-FD and AB test (AR2)-FD stand for Arellano-Bond test for AR in first differences and Arellano-Bond test for AR in second differences, respectively.
